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Abstract. Although there are many diﬀerent approaches used in crypt-
analysis of nonlinear ﬁlter generators, the selection of tap positions in
connection to guess and determine cryptanalysis has not received enough
attention yet. In a recent article [18], it was shown that the so-called ﬁlter
state guessing attack (FSGA) introduced in [15], which applies to LFSR
based schemes that use (vectorial) Boolean ﬁltering functions, performs
much better if the placement of tap positions is taken into account. In
this article, for a given LFSR of length L, we analyze the problem of
selecting n (where n  L) tap positions of the driving LFSR (used as
binary inputs to a ﬁltering function) optimally so that the complexity of
FSGA like attacks is maximized. An algorithm which provides a subop-
timal solution to this problem is developed and it can be used for real-life
applications when the choice of tap positions is to be made.
Keywords: Stream ciphers · Filtering generator · Guess and determine
cryptanalysis · Filter state guessing attack · Tap positions
1 Introduction
Nonlinear ﬁlter generator is a typical representative of a hardware oriented design
in stream ciphers. It consists of a single linear feedback shift register (LFSR) and
a nonlinear function F : GF (2)n −→ GF (2)m that processes a ﬁxed subset of
n stages of the LFSR. This ﬁxed subset of the LFSR’s cells is usually called
the taps.
There are many cryptanalytic approaches that have been applied to non-
linear ﬁlter generators during the last two decades. These methods mainly use
the cryptographic weaknesses of the ﬁltering function giving rise to Berlekamp-
Massey linear complexity attacks [10], linear distinguishing and inversion attacks
of Golic´ [5–7], algebraic attacks [4], probabilistic algebraic attacks [2,17], and so
on. To protect a nonlinear ﬁlter generator against these attacks, the ﬁltering
function should satisfy multiple cryptographic criteria that include high nonlin-
earity, high algebraic degree [14], high algebraic immunity (AI) [11], and many
others.
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Apart from resisting the attacks using the properties of the ﬁltering function,
a nonlinear ﬁlter generator should also have suﬃcient security margins against
other generic cryptanalytic methods, e.g. time-memory-data tradeoﬀ attacks
[1,8,9], and guess and determine attacks. A classical guess and determine attack
is a method based on guessing some portion of the secret key (state bits) in order
to decrease the complexity of obtaining the remaining unknown key (state) bits.
Recently, a new guess and determine attack, named Filter State Guessing Attack
(FSGA), was introduced in [15]. The basic idea behind the FSGA is to perform
a guess and determine attack on the preimage space of the ﬁltering function
F : GF (2)n −→ GF (2)m. Since for uniformly distributed F there are 2n−m such
preimages , for any observed m-bit output block the attacker may for each choice
of 2n−m many possible inputs (over the whole set of sampling instances) set up
an overdeﬁned system of linear equations in secret state bits. This attack turns
out to be successful only for relatively large m, more precisely for approximately
m > n/2.
In certain cases, the running time of the FSGA may be lower than the running
time of a classical algebraic attack (cf. [15]). In particular, a superior performance
of the FSGA over classical algebraic attacks was demonstrated in the case the
ﬁltering function belongs to a class of vectorial Maiorana-McFarland functions
(see e.g. [3]). Notice that the tap positions of a nonlinear ﬁlter generator are of no
importance for the FSGA in [15]. More precisely, only one bit of the information
was considered to be known from the previous sampling points. The complexity
of the attack was signiﬁcantly improved in [18], where the information from the
neighbouring taps, in the attack named GFSGA (Generalized FSGA), was used
for a further reduction of the preimage space. In particular, the attack complexity
of GFSGA is very sensitive to the tap placements, though no algorithm for their
choice was provided in [18]. The reader should however notice that there exist
other kind of attacks on nonlinear ﬁltering generators such as e.g. decimation
attacks [12] and attacks that take the advantage of the normality of Boolean
functions [13] whose complexity does not depend on the choice of tap positions.
The main motivation for this work relies on the fact that even after more
than two decades of extensive research on the security and design of ﬁltering
generators the selection of tap positions has not been rigorously treated yet. The
designers, well aware of the fact that a proper tap selection plays an important
role in the design, mainly use some standard (heuristic) design rationales such as
taking the diﬀerences between the positions to be prime numbers (if possible),
the taps are distributed over the whole LFSR etc. Intuitively, selecting the taps at
some consecutive positions of the LFSR should be avoided, and similarly placing
these taps at the positions used for the realization of the feedback connection
polynomial is not a good idea either. Another common criterion is to ensure that
a multiset of diﬀerences of the tap positions is mutually coprime. This means,
that for a given set of tap positions I = {i1, i2, . . . , in} of an LFSR of length L
(thus 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < . . . < in ≤ L) all the elements in the diﬀerence set formed
as D = {ij − il : ij , il ∈ I, ij > il} are mutually coprime. In many situations, in
real-life applications, this condition turns out to be hard to satisfy. To the best
of our knowledge, no algorithm for determining an optimal tap placement, for
given n and L, has been provided so far.
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In this article, we ﬁrstly demonstrate some potentially misleading design
rationales from the security point of view and discuss the complexity issues
related to optimality. Indeed, for a standard size of an LFSR used in these
schemes, say L = 256, and a recommended number of inputs n ≥ 16, any
exhaustive search over the set of
(
L
n
)
elements is clearly infeasible. Therefore, we
propose a suboptimal algorithm for this purpose, which at least when applied to
LFSRs of relatively short length performs optimally (giving the best choice over
all possibilities) . It is also shown that certain choices of tap positions in real-life
stream ciphers such as SOBER-t32 and SFINX could have been (slightly) further
optimized with respect to guess and determine cryptanalysis, in particular their
resistance to GFSGA would have been better.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, basic deﬁnitions
regarding Boolean functions and the mathematical formalism behind their use
with LFSRs is given. A brief overview of FSGA and GFSGA is given in Sect. 3.
Section 4 discusses the relation between the complexity of the GFSGA attack
and the number of repeated equations used in the reduction of the preimage
space. Two versions of the algorithm for determining (sub)optimal tap positions
for a given n and L are presented in Sect. 5, and their application for the choice
of tap positions in SOBER-t32 and SFINX is discussed.
2 Preliminaries
A Boolean function is a mapping from GF (2)n to GF (2), where GF (2) denotes
the binary Galois ﬁeld and GF (2)n is an n-dimendional vector space spanned
over GF (2). A function f : GF (2)n → GF (2) is commonly represented using its
associated algebraic normal form (ANF) as follows:
f(x1, ..., xn) =
∑
u∈GF (2)n
λu(Πni=1xi
ui),
where xi ∈ GF (2), (i = 1, ..., n), λu ∈ GF (2), u = (u1, ..., un) ∈ GF (2)n.
A vectorial (multiple output) Boolean function F (x) is a mapping from GF (2)n
to GF (2)m, with (m ≥ 1), which can also be regarded as a collection of m
Boolean functions, i.e., F (x) = (f1(x), . . . , fm(x)). Commonly, F (x) is chosen
to be uniformly distributed, that is, #{x ∈ GF (2)n|F (x) = z} = 2n−m, for all
z ∈ GF (2)m. Moreover, for any z = (z1, ..., zm) ∈ GF (2)m, we denote the set of
preimage values by Sz = {x ∈ GF (2)n | F (x) = z}.
2.1 Nonlinear Filtering Generator
A ﬁltering generator consists of a single LFSR of length L whose n ﬁxed positions
(taps) are used as the inputs to a ﬁltering function F : GF (2)n → GF (2)m (also
represented as F (x) = (f1(x), ..., fm(x))), thus outputting m ≥ 1 keystream bits
at the time. A general description of a ﬁlter generator is as follows:
(zt1, . . . , z
t
m) = (f1(n(s
t)), . . . , fm(n(st))),
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where st = (st0, . . . , s
t
L−1) is the secret state of the LFSR at time t, the notation
n(st) means that a subset of n bits of st = (st0, . . . , s
t
L−1) (at ﬁxed positions)
is passed as the input to Boolean functions f1, . . . , fm, and zt1, . . . , z
t
m are the
corresponding output keystream bits.
Due to linearity of its feedback connection polynomial, at any t > 0 we
have n(st0, . . . , s
t
L−1) = (ψ
t
1(s), . . . , ψ
t
n(s)), where the linear functions ψ
t
i(s) =∑L−1
j=0 a
t
i,jsj , (i = 1, . . . , n), are unique linear combinations of the initial secret
state bits s0 = (s0, . . . , sL−1), at time t = 0. The LFSR is updated by computing
the update bit sL (as a linear combination of s0, . . . , sL−1 determined by the
connection polynomial) and shifting its content to the left (while at the same
time outputting the bit s0), so that s1 = (s1, . . . , sL). The binary coeﬃcients
ati,j above can therefore be eﬃciently computed from the connection polynomial
of LFSR for all t ≥ 0.
3 Overview of FSGA and GFSGA
For self-completeness and due to the close relation with subsequent sections, we
brieﬂy describe the main ideas behind FSGA and its extension GFSGA. For
both attacks there is no restriction on F : GF (2)n → GF (2)m, thus F satisﬁes
all the relevant criteria including a uniform distribution of its preimages.
3.1 FSGA Description
For every observation of the cipher output zt = (zt1, . . . , z
t
m) at time t, there
are 2n−m possible inputs xt ∈ Szt . Moreover, for every guessed preimage xt =
(xt1, . . . , x
t
n) ∈ Szt , one obtains n linear equations in the secret state bits s0, . . . ,
sL−1 through xti =
∑L−1
j=0 a
t
i,jsj , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The goal of the attacker is
to recover the initial state bits (s0, . . . , sL−1) after obtaining suﬃciently many
keystream blocks zt = (zt1, . . . , z
t
m). If the attacker observes the outputs at the
time instances t1, . . . , tc, so that nc > L, then with high probability each sys-
tem of nc linear equations is independent but only one system will provide a
consistent (correct) solution.
As there are 2(n−m)c possibilities of choosing c input tuples (xt11 , . . . , x
t1
n ), . . . ,
(xtc1 , . . . , x
tc
n ), and for each such c-tuple a system of nc linear equations in L
variables is obtained. The complexity of solving a single overdeﬁned system of
linear equations with L variables is about L3 operations. Thus, the complexity
of the FSGA is about 2(n−m)cL3 operations, where c ≈ Ln .
3.2 GFSGA Description
The major diﬀerence to FSGA is that the GFSGA method eﬃciently utilizes
the tap positions of the underlying LFSR. Let the tap positions of the LFSR
be speciﬁed by the set I0 = {i1, i2, . . . , in}, 1 ≤ i1 ≤ i2 ≤ . . . ≤ in ≤ L. If
at the time instance t1, we assume that the content of the LFSR at these tap
Optimizing the Placement of Tap Positions 19
positions is given by (st1i1 , . . . , s
t1
in
) = (a1, . . . , an), then at t = t1 + σ we have
(st1+σi1+σ , . . . , s
t1+σ
in+σ
) = (a1, . . . , an), where cutting modulo L can be performed if
necessary. Notice that the state bits at positions i1 + σ, . . . , in + σ does not nec-
essarily intersect with I0, thus if the intersection is an empty set no information
from the previous sampling can be used at the sampling instance t1 + σ. How-
ever, we can always select σ so that at least one bit of information is conveyed.
More formally, the observed outputs at t1, . . . , tc, where ti = t1 + (i − 1)σ and
1 ≤ σ ≤ (in − i1), may give rise to identical linear equations since the equations
xtui =
∑L−1
j=0 a
tu
i,jsj (where 1 ≤ i ≤ n) may be shifted to xtvl =
∑L−1
j=0 a
tv
i,jsj , for
some 1 ≤ i < l ≤ n, 1 ≤ u < v ≤ c.
It is of importance to determine how many identical linear equations will be
obtained for all the sampling instances t1, . . . , tc. By introducing k = 	 in−i1σ 
,
and for I0 = {i1, i2, . . . , in} deﬁning recursively:
I1 = I0 ∩ {i1 + σ, i2 + σ, . . . , in + σ},
I2 = I1 ∪ {I0 ∩ {i1 + 2σ, i2 + 2σ, . . . , in + 2σ}},
... (1)
Ik = Ik−1 ∪ {I0 ∩ {i1 + kσ, i2 + kσ, . . . , in + kσ}}.
the analysis in [18] showed that the complexity of the GFSGA is closely related
to the parameter ri = #Ii, where i = 1, . . . , k.
Remark 1. For instance, the above notation means that for some i ∈ I1 (and
therefore i ∈ I0) the state bit st2i was used in the previous sampling since it
was at the position i − σ ∈ I0 at time t1, where t2 = t1 + σ. The idea is easily
generalized for #Ii = ri, where i = 2, . . . , k.
The number of identical equations obtained in [18] is given as follows. If c ≤ k,
then in total
∑c−1
i=1 ri identical linear equations are obtained, whereas for c > k
this number is
∑k
i=1 ri + (c − k − 1)rk. Note that in this case rk = rk+1 = · · · =
rc−1 due to the deﬁnition of k, which simply guarantees that after k sampling
instances the maximum (and constant) number of repeated equations is attained.
Consequently, the time complexity of the attack for c ≤ k was estimated as,
T c≤kComp. = 2
(n−m) × 2(n−m−r1) × . . . × 2(n−m−r(c−1)) × L3
= 2(n−m)c−
∑c−1
i=1 ri × L3, (2)
and similarly, if c > k, the time complexity for c > k was given by
T c>kComp. = 2
(n−m) × 2(n−m−r1) × . . .×
× 2(n−m−rk) × 2(n−m−rk)×(c−k−1) × L3
= 2(n−m)c−(
∑k
i=1 ri+(c−k−1)rk) × L3. (3)
Remark 2. If n − m − ri ≤ 0, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, then the knowledge of
these ri bits allows the attacker to uniquely identify the exact preimage value
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form the set of 2n−m possible preimages, i.e., we assume 2(n−m−ri) = 1 when
n − m − ri ≤ 0.
Table 1 (cf. [18]) gives a complexity comparison of FSGA, GFSGA and CAA
(Classical algebraic Attack). The tap positions and the sampling diﬀerence σ
are given below:
(1) {3, 8, 13, 16, 21, 29, 32, 37, 44, 52, 67, 79, 92, 106, 111, 125, 155}, σ = 5, c = 23.
(2) {2, 7, 17, 25, 27, 31, 48, 58, 61, 73, 82, 91, 103, 115, 123, 134, 146, 156}, σ = 3,
c = 20.
Table 1. Complexity comparison for diﬀerent (n,m) and (K = 80, L = 160).
(n,m) (17, 6) (18, 7)
FSGA 2123 2121
CAA 275 275
GFSGA 253.97 264.97
4 Complexity Versus the Number of Repeated Equations
The complexity of GFSGA, which is a generic attack for this particular encryp-
tion scheme, strongly depends on the choice of tap positions, see also [18]. There-
fore, our goal is to maximize this complexity which is certainly related to the
minimization of the parameters ri = #Ii, but not completely equivalent. Notice
that by optimizing the resistance of these schemes to GFSGA does not neces-
sarily imply the optimality of tap selections, though for the targeted ﬁltering
generator we cannot see other reasonable approaches in the context of the guess
and determine cryptanalysis.
Let R denotes the number of repeated equations regardless of this number
being
∑c−1
i=1 ri for c ≤ k, or
∑k
i=1 ri + (c − k − 1)rk for c > k. From [18], it
somehow appears that an (sub)optimal choice of tap positions is the one that
minimizes the number of repeated equations R, which is a bit misleading as
illustrated by the following example.
Example 1. Let the tap positions be given by I0 = {1, 5, 13, 25, 41, 65, 77}, for
L = 80, n = 7, and m = 3. Computing the complexity TComp. for all sampling
diﬀerences σ = 1, 2, 3, . . . , 76, one can verify that the best choice of σ for the
attacker is σ = 12, with the minimal complexity TComp. ≈ 223.97 and having
R = 177 as the number of repeated equations. However, the computation below
shows that for σ = 4, R = 353 is maximum possible, but in that case TComp. ≈
227.97.
To see why σ = 4 is not optimal for the attacker, we ﬁrst compute ri = #Ii,
I1 = {5}, I2 = {5, 13}, I3 = {5, 13, 25, 77}, I4 = {5, 13, 25, 41, 77},
I5 = {5, 13, 25, 41, 77}, I6 = {5, 13, 25, 41, 65, 77},
Ij = {5, 13, 25, 41, 65, 77}, for j = 7, 8, . . . , 61.
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The number of sampling points c, for k = 	 77−14 
 = 19, is determined from
the condition nc − (∑ki=1 ri + (c − k − 1)rk) > L, i.e., c = 62 is the smallest
positive integer satisfying the condition. The terms 2(n−m−ri) = 1 in (3), for
which ri < n − m so that the number of preimages is greater than one, only
appear for r1 = 1 and r2 = 2, i.e.,
TComp. = 2(n−m) × 2(n−m−r1) × 2(n−m−r2) × L3 ≈ 227.97.
For j = 3, . . . , 61, we have 2(n−m−rj) = 1, in accordance to Remark 2.
Similarly, for σ = 12, which implies that k = 6, we obtain c = 37 (where c is
derived from nc − (∑ki=1 ri + (c − k − 1)rk) > L) and “only”R = 177 repeated
equations. The intersection sets in this case are given as,
I1 = {13, 25, 77}, I2 = {13, 25, 65, 77}, I3 = {13, 25, 41, 65, 77},
Ij = {13, 25, 41, 65, 77}, for j = 4, 5, . . . , 36.
The complexity computation in this case involves only r1 = 3, i.e.,
TComp. = 2(n−m) × 2(n−m−r1) × L3 ≈ 223.97.
Notice that for j = 2, . . . , 36, we have 2(n−m−rj) = 1.
Remark 3. A lower complexity in the above example (for a larger number of
repeated equations) is entirely due to a low diﬀerence between n and m so that
many of the repeated equations could not be eﬃciently used since the preimages
could be identiﬁed uniquely even without using these equations.
More formally, if σ′ gives the maximal possible value of R though the attack
complexity is not minimal, and σ′′ gives the minimal attack complexity without
maximizing R, then it holds
∑
rj∈Hσ′′
(n − m − rj) <
∑
ri∈Hσ′
(n − m − ri) (4)
where Hσ′ = {ri < n − m : ri obtained by σ′, i = 1, 2, . . . , c − 1} and Hσ′′ =
{rj < n − m : rj obtained by σ′′, j = 1, 2, . . . , c − 1}. In the above example, we
have Hσ′ = {r1, r2} = {1, 2} with σ′ = 4, and Hσ′′ = {r1} = {3} with σ′′ = 12,
for which (4) holds.
Another problem related to the approach of ﬁnding the intersection sets
given by (1) is that the information contained in R and the cardinalities ri alone
does not fully speciﬁes the properties of the repeated equations. The equations
corresponding to the numbers in the sets Ii may be repeated and found in other
sets Ij , where i = j, and even though they eﬃciently reduce the preimage space
they do not contribute to the rank of the systems of linear equations that need to
be solved. An alternative method of tracking the repeated equations, illustrated
in the example bellow, turns out to give a deeper insight to the problem of
selecting the tap positions optimally.
22 E. Pasalic et al.
Example 2. Let the tap positions be given by I0 = {l1, l2, l3, l4, l5} = {1, 4, 8,
9, 11}, L = 15, and the sampling distance σ = 2. Let sti = (s0+(i−1)σ,
s1+(i−1)σ, . . . , s14+(i−1)σ), denote the LFSR state over c = 10 sampling instances
ti = (i−1)σ, for i = 1, 2, . . . , 10. Moreover, at these diﬀerent sampling instances,
we represent the output bits of LFSR s0, s1, . . . via their indices in N, i.e.,
sk → (k +1) ∈ N. For instance, in Table 2 the number 27 corresponds to the bit
s26 which becomes a part of the LFSR state st9 at position l5. The LFSR state
bits at tap positions I0 = {l1, l2, l3, l4, l5} are illustrated in Table 2.
Table 2. The LFSR state bits at given tap positions for σ = 2.
States l1 l2 l3 l4 l5
st1 s0 → 1 s3 → 4 s7 → 8 s8 → 9 s10 → 11
st2 s2 → 3 s5 → 6 s9 → 10 s10 → 11 s12 → 13
st3 s4 → 5 s7 → 8 s11 → 12 s12 → 13 s14 → 15
st4 s6 → 7 s9 → 10 s13 → 14 s14 → 15 s16 → 17
st5 s8 → 9 s11 → 12 s15 → 16 s16 → 17 s18 → 19
st6 s10 → 11 s13 → 14 s17 → 18 s18 → 19 s20 → 21
st7 s12 → 13 s15 → 16 s19 → 20 s20 → 21 s22 → 23
st8 s14 → 15 s17 → 18 s21 → 22 s22 → 23 s24 → 25
st9 s16 → 17 s19 → 20 s23 → 24 s24 → 25 s26 → 27
st10 s18 → 19 s21 → 22 s25 → 26 s26 → 27 s28 → 29
Our goal is to determine when some equation (state bit) is repeated on the tap
positions l1, . . . , l4 at the sampling instances ti. Hence, we observe the repetition
of all consecutive tap positions lj+1 − lj , then the diﬀerences lj+2 − lj , etc. Let
D be a set of all diﬀerences between consecutive tap positions, i.e.,
D = {dj |dj = lj+1 − lj , j = 1, 2, 3, 4} = {3, 4, 1, 2}.
To consider all possible repetitions of the equations on all tap positions, we
design a scheme of all possible diﬀerences:
Table 3. The scheme of all possible diﬀerences for the set D.
Row\Columns Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4
Row 1 d1 d2 d3 d4
Row 2 d1 + d2 d2 + d3 d3 + d4
Row 3 d1 + d2 + d3 d2 + d3 + d4
Row 4 d1 + d2 + d3 + d4
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Table 4. The scheme of all diﬀerences for D = {3, 4, 1, 2}.
Row\Columns Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4
Row 1 3 4 1 2
Row 2 7 5 3
Row 3 8 7
Row 4 10
In Table 3, Column 1 speciﬁes the repetition of some equations at the tap posi-
tion l1, Column 2 gives the repetition of equations on l2, etc. Similarly, Row 1 takes
into account the consecutive repetitions from li+1 to li, Row 2 regards the repe-
tition from li+2 to li, etc. In our example, by Table 3, we have Assuming the
attacker starts the sampling with some step σ, the total number of repeated
equations R is the sum of all equations which repeat on each of the tap positions
lj , where j = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Since Table 3 can be designed for an arbitrary set D, #D = n − 1, the
repetition of the same equations can be tracked as follows. We are looking for
the ﬁrst number in each column such that it is divisible by σ, which implies that
we have the repetition of equations, otherwise there are no repetitions. Notice
that in Table 4, in Column 1, σ  3, which implies that there is no repetition of
equations from l2 at l1. Also, since 2  7, there is no repetition from l3 at l1.
However, 2 | 8, which implies that the equation(s) from l4 will appear on l1 after
8
2 = 4 sampling instances (cf. Table 2 where 9 appears at l1 when the content of
the LFSR is st5). Thereafter, one equation from l4 appears at l1 for every state
sti , for i ≥ 5. Further, the fact that 2 | 8 and 2 | 10 implies that 2 | d4 = 2,
which means that we have a repetition from l5 to l1 at every LFSR state sti,
i ≥ 2. Since Column 1 already contains this number 8 which is divisible by 2, all
the repeated equations from l5 to l1 are already taken into account, and we do
not use number 10 (Table 4, Row 4) when calculating the number of repeated
equations. So, d42 is related to the repetitions of equations from l5 to l4. Hence,
the number of repeated equations R, for c = 10, is calculated as follows.
1. On l1, there are (c − d1+d2+d3σ ) = 10 − 82 = 6 repeated equations.
2. On l2, there are (c − d2σ ) = 10 − 2 = 8 repeated equations.
3. On l3, there are NO repeated equations, since we do not have the diﬀerences
divisible by σ = 2.
4. On l4, there are (c − d4σ ) = 9 repeated equations.
In total, we have R = 6 + 8 + 0 + 9 = 23 repeated equations.
The analysis performed in the above example leads to the following result con-
cerning the number of repeated equations.
Proposition 1. Let I0 = {l1, l2, . . . , ln} be a set of tap positions, and let
D = {li+1 − li|i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1} = {d1, d2, . . . , dn−1}.
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The number of repeated equations is calculated as
R =
n−1∑
i=1
(c − 1
σ
m∑
k=i
dk), (5)
where σ | ∑mk=i dk for some m ∈ N, i ≤ m ≤ n − 1 and 1σ
∑m
k=i dk ≤ c − 1.
Moreover, if 1σ
∑m
k=i dk ≥ c, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, then (c − 1σ
∑m
k=i dk) = 0.
This means that the repetition of the same equations (bits) starts to appear after
the LFSR state stc .
Remark 4. The importance of the above proposition lies in a fact that the count-
ing method of repeated equations does not depend on the relation between the
number of sampling points c and k (where k = 	 in−i1σ 
), i.e., it holds for both
c ≤ k and c > k.
Notice that, in order to minimize the number of repeated equations, the terms
(c − 1σ
∑m
k=i dk), i ≤ m ≤ n − 1, should be minimized. Hence, we want to
avoid the divisibility by σ in the scheme of diﬀerences as much as possible.
Moreover, for a given length L of LFSR, the diﬀerences between di ∈ D should
be maximized under the constraint
∑n−1
i=1 di ≤ L − 1, which is also conditioned
by 1 ≤ l1 < l2 < . . . < ln ≤ L. In other words, the goal is to distribute the tap
positions over entire LFSR while at the same time keeping the divisibility by σ
as low as possible. Clearly, if
∑n−1
i=1 di = L − 1, then l1 = 1 and ln = L.
5 Two Algorithms Towards an Optimal Selection of Taps
It turns out that the problem of optimizing the choice of I0 is closely related to
the divisibility of the elements in the corresponding (multi)set of diﬀerences D
by an arbitrary σ. Thus, instead of searching the set I0 directly, we focus on the
set of diﬀerences D. The construction of the set D is however out of reach to be
done exhaustively for moderately large L and n, and consequently we use some
heuristic techniques to specify D (sub)optimally.
In what follows, we present a method of constructing the set D which gives
a low number of repeated equations (conﬁrmed by computer simulations) for
every σ. The set D is speciﬁed using some heuristic design rationales (see below)
and at the same time the diﬀerences di are maximized.
Step A: Find the elements of the set D. To do this and avoid the divisibility
by σ, the following pattern is applied.
1. Prime numbers are the most favourable to join the set D. Since higher values
of n dictate the repetitions of some elements in D, the repetition should be
kept on minimum with a general tendency to choose co-prime diﬀerences.
If some even numbers are taken, then the set D should contain just few of
them, because they can result in many common (high) factors in the rows of
Table 3.
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2. Maximize the diﬀerences di under the constraint
∑
di∈D di ≤ L − 1.
Step B: Find the best ordering of the chosen diﬀerences, which basically means
that ordering of D is also important. This can be done using the following
algorithm with the complexity O(n! ·K), where K corresponds to the complexity
of calculation TComp. for all possible σ.
INPUT: The set D and the numbers L, n = #D + 1 and m.
OUTPUT: The best ordering of the chosen diﬀerences, that is, an ordered set
D that maximizes the complexity of the attack.
STEP 1: Generate a list of all permutations of the elements in D;
STEP 2: For every permutation, ﬁnd the minimal complexity for all steps σ
from 1 to L;
STEP 3: Generate a list of all minimal complexities from Step 2;
STEP 4: Find the maximal value in the list of all minimal complexities;
STEP 5: Return the corresponding permutation of the maximal value.
Open Problem 1. Find an eﬃcient algorithm, which returns the best ordering
of the set D without searching all permutations.
Remark 5. To measure the quality of a chosen set of diﬀerences D with respect
to the maximization of TComp. over all σ, the computer simulations indicate that
an optimal ordering of the set D implies a small value of an optimal sampling
distance σ. This is also a criterion that a set D is most likely chosen well (a sub-
optimal choice). The term “most likely” concerns the diﬃculties of capturing the
whole process of choosing the tap positions explicitly, due to a very complicated
relation between σ, R, D and TComp. through the scheme of diﬀerences. When
choosing an output permutation (cf. Step 5 below), we always consider both σ
and TComp. though σ turns out to be a more stable indicator of the quality of a
chosen set D.
Note that, the above algorithm performs an exhaustive search over all permuta-
tions of the input set. For practical values of L, usually taken to be L = 256, the
time complexity of the above algorithm becomes practically infeasible already
for n > 10. To reduce its factorial time complexity, we modify the above algo-
rithm to process the subsets of the multiset D separately within the feasibility
constraints imposed on the cardinalities of these subsets.
STEP 1: Choose a set X by Step A, where #X < #D for which Step B is
feasible;
STEP 2: Find the best ordering of X using the algorithm in Step B for
LX = 1 +
∑
xi∈X xi < L and mX = 	#X · mn−1
;
STEP 3: Choose a set Y by Step A, where #Y < #D for which Step B is
feasible;
STEP 4: “Generate” a list of all permutations of the elements in Y ;
26 E. Pasalic et al.
STEP 5: Find a permutation (Yp) from the above list such that for a ﬁxed set
X, the new set YpX obtained by joining X to Yp, denoted by YpX
(with the parameters LYpX = 1 +
∑
xi∈X xi +
∑
yi∈Yp yi ≤ L and
mYpX = 	#YpX · mn−1
), allows a small optimal step σ, in the sense
of Remark 5;
STEP 6: If such a permutation, resulting in a small value of σ, does not exist
in Step 5, then back to Step 3 and choose another set Y ;
STEP 7: Update the set X ← YpX, and repeat the steps 3 - 5 by adjoining
new sets Yp until #YpX = n − 1;
STEP 8: Return the set D = YpX.
Remark 6. The parameters LX and mX are derived by computer simulations,
where LX essentially constrains the set X and mX keeps the proportionality
between the numbers m,#X and #D = n − 1.
An illustration of our modiﬁed version of the above algorithm is given in the
following example. Namely, for a rather practical choice of the parameters L,
n and m, the whole procedure of deﬁning the set of diﬀerences that eventually
yields the tap positions is discussed. Some suboptimal choices of tap positions for
varying input parameters L, n,m along with the time complexity of the GFSGA
and the time complexity of applying our algorithms are given in Appendix (cf.
Tables 5 and 6).
Example 3. Let n = 17, m = 6, and F (x) : GF (2)17 −→ GF (2)6. Let L = 160
bits, the length of the secret key is K = 80 bits.
Let X = {5, 13, 7, 26, 11, 17} be obtained using the algorithm in Step B
for LX = 80, mX = 2. Let Y = {1, 2, 9, 15, 23}. Then, a permutation Yp =
{9, 1, 2, 23, 15}, i.e., the set
YpX = {9, 1, 2, 23, 15, 5, 13, 7, 26, 11, 17},
where LYpX = 130 and mYpX = 4, gives that σ = 1 is an optimal sam-
pling distance for the attacker. Since LYpX ≤ 160, then we choose the set
Z = {3, 4, 5, 7, 11}. Then, a permutation Zp = {5, 11, 4, 3, 7}, i.e., the set
ZpYpX = {5, 11, 4, 3, 7, 9, 1, 2, 23, 15, 5, 13, 7, 26, 11, 17}, where LZpYpX = L =
160 and mLZpYpX = m = 6 gives the optimal step σ = 1 for the attacker. Then
we have
D = {5, 11, 4, 3, 7, 9, 1, 2, 23, 15, 5, 13, 7, 26, 11, 17},
and thus
I0 = {1, 6, 17, 21, 24, 31, 40, 41, 43, 66, 81, 86, 99, 106, 132, 143, 160}.
Hence, σ = 1 is optimal, with the minimal complexity TComp. = 286.97,
which is essentially an extremely good choice of tap positions (non-exhaustively
conﬁrmed to be an optimal choice).
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In what follows, we apply the above algorithms to two well-known stream cipher
SOBER-t32 [16], [18] and SFINX [19].
SOBER-t32: An application of the GFSGA attack on unstuttered SOBER-
t32 was considered in [18]. The tap positions of SOBER-t32 are given by I0 =
{1, 4, 11, 16, 17} (corresponding to the reverse order of the taps 1 ← s16, 4 ← s13,
etc.) and the sampling distance used in [18] was σ = 3. Due to the reverse order
of the bits si, we consider the set D in reverse order , i.e. D = {1, 5, 7, 3} instead
of {3, 7, 5, 1}, since this ordering corresponds to our consideration of the LFSR
states presented in Table 2. Regarding the set D, the set of all ri = #I0 is
{1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, . . .}, i.e. r1 = r2 = 1, r2 = r3 = 2, r4 = r5 = 3 and
rk = 4, k ≥ 7. At each sampling point we derive 40 − 8 × ri linear equations
(cf. [18]). Therefore, the number of repeated equations is given by
40 + 32 + 32 + 24 + 24 + 16 + 16 + 8 × (c − 7) + c, (6)
which for c = 47 gives R = 550 linear equations (6). Thus the complexity of the
attack can be estimated as
TD = (17 × 32)3 × 235 × 22×27 × 22×19 × 22×11 × 239×3 = (17 × 32)3 × 2266.
Since #D = 4, we can easily apply Step A and Step B, to come up with
the new set D∗ = {5, 2, 7, 2}, and get the set {0, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, . . .} of all
ri = #I0. The inequality
40 + 40 + 32 + 32 + 32 + 24 + 24 + 8 × (c − 7) + c ≥ 544
implies c = 42, and R = 546 equations. The complexity is estimated as
TD∗ = (17 × 32)3 × 22×35 × 23×27 × 22×19 × 234×3 = (17 × 32)3 × 2291.
This means that our algorithm gives the tap selection with much better resistance
against GFSGA.
SFINX: The design details of SFINX can be found in [19]. The set of the tap
positions of SFINX is given as
I0 = {1, 2, 7, 10, 20, 22, 45, 59, 75, 99, 106, 135, 162, 194, 228, 245, 256},
and D = {1, 5, 3, 10, 2, 23, 14, 16, 24, 7, 29, 27, 32, 34, 17, 11}. An optimal step of
the GFSGA attack on this set of tap positions, is σ = 2 which requires c = 27
sampling points, resulting in R = 200 sampled equations for obtaining an overde-
ﬁned system. The corresponding complexity in this case is TComp. = 2256. Note
that
∑16
i=1 di = 255 with optimal step σ = 2, which indicates that the set
of tap positions I0 of SFINX is chosen well. However, we can use the ele-
ments of the given set D and our algorithm to create the set of diﬀerences “by
parts”, in order to decrease the number of repeated equations R and increase
the complexity (slightly). Starting with the set X = {29, 32, 17, 34, 27, 11}, and
permuting the set Yp = {2, 23, 14, 16, 24, 7} for LYpX = 237, we get the set
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YpX = {2, 23, 14, 7, 16, 24, 29, 32, 17, 34, 27, 11} with an optimal step σ = 8 for
the attack. Then, taking the set Zp = {1, 5, 3, 10}, we get the set D∗ = ZpYpX
given as
D∗ = {1, 5, 3, 10, 2, 23, 14, 7, 16, 24, 29, 32, 17, 34, 27, 11},
with the optimal steps σ ∈ {1, 2} for the attack. The estimated complexity for
both optimal steps is TComp. = 2257 with R = 167 repeated equations, thus only
a minor improvement has been achieved.
It would be of interest to consider the problem of optimizing the placement
of tap positions in case the GFSGA attack with a variable sampling step (σ is
not ﬁxed) is used, which is left for the extended version of this article.
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Appendix
In Table 5 we give several instances for determining suboptimal tap positions of
LFSRs of diﬀerent length. The following parameters are used:
– L is the length of LFSR;
– n and m are parameters related to vectorial Boolean function F : GF (2)n →
GF (2)m;
– D is a set of diﬀerences between tap positions;
– c is the minimal number of observed outputs needed for an overdeﬁned system
– R is the number of repeated equations for given c outputs;
– σ is an optimal step of the GFSGA attack;
– TComp. is the time complexity of GFSGA.
Table 5. Speciﬁcations of diﬀerence sets for LFSRs of diﬀerent lengths.
L (n,m) D R c σ TComp.
80 (7,2) {5, 13, 7, 26, 11, 17} 24 15 1 269.97
120 (13,3) {5, 7, 3, 13, 6, 11, 5, 11, 7, 13, 21, 17} 61 14 3 299.7
160 (17,6) {5,11,4,3,7,9,1,2,23,15,5, 13, 7, 26, 11, 17} 128 17 1 286.97
200 (21,7) {3, 7, 9, 13, 18, 7, 9, 1, 2, 9, 1, 2, 23, 15, 5, 13, 7,
26, 11, 17}
175 18 1 2108.9
256 (27,9) {5, 9, 13, 4, 7, 19, 3, 7, 9, 13, 18, 7, 9, 1, 2, 9, 1, 2,
23, 15, 5, 13, 7, 26, 11, 17}
227 18 1 2135
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Remark 7. From the diﬀerence sets D in Table 5 we easily obtain the tap
positions.
Table 6. Time complexities for ﬁnding tap positions in Table 5.
L (n,m) Cardinality of parts Complexity Times in sec
80 (7,2) no parts O(K · 6!) 135
120 (13,3) (6,6) 2 · O(K · 6!) 125+162=287
160 (17,6) (6,6,4) 2 · O(K · 6!) + O(K · 4!) 137+198+8.5=343.5
200 (21,7) (6,6,4,4) 2 · O(K · 6!) + 2 · O(K · 4!) 137+96+7.7+9.5=250
256 (27,9) (6,6,4,4,6) 3 · O(K · 6!) + 2 · O(K · 4!) 250+369.3=619.3
Remark 8. Note that the time required to create some particular set of diﬀer-
ences depends on the cardinality of parts. It means that the smaller cardinalities
implies the lower time complexity, though such an approach may provide the
solutions that are “far” from optimal. Table 6 presents the following:
– Cardinality of parts refers to the modiﬁed algorithm on Page 10, bottom.
For instance, (6, 6, 4) means that we take #X = 6 elements and ﬁnding its
optimal permutation requires 137 sec with our permutation algorithm. Then,
we take another #Yp = 6 elements and determine its best order which ﬁts to
the set X, which requires 198 seconds (modiﬁed algorithm). Finally, the same
procedure is applied to the set YpX by adding Zp = 4 elements using again
our modiﬁed algorithm (requiring 8.5 sec). The resulting set of diﬀerences is
given as D = ZpYpX.
– Complexity refers to the complexity of the permutation algorithms Step B
and its modiﬁcation used to construct the set D.
– The constant K regards the procedure described in the permutation algorithm
(Step B): creating the list, searching, etc.
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